![]() Pascal's argument itself is binary/natural so it can also be easily refuted with a "natural" sounding counter-argument if you want to wrap it into more mathematically rigid conditions. Even if we rephrased the argument to make it sound more fuzzy the point would still stand in my opinion. Currently, with such a blatant logical fallacy, I consider the argument to be on the same level as the arguments in favor of Pascal's wager, that is, they sound nice at first but break down on a closer look. It only requires a single logical mistake to make an argument completely invalid, so this is critical and needs fixing. The argument as it is currently in the article contains a logical fallacity, illustrated by the counterexample with the set of natural numbers. EmeraldCityWanderer ( talk) 16:19, 24 February 2016 (UTC) ![]() As shown in the example of natural numbers, there does not have to be an opposite/negative of each god even with the premise of an infinite amount of gods existing. However all gods could be equal in all the other (or a select few) attributes, like all of them requiring exclusiveness or belief in them for a reward. God A doesn't care about bananas while god B likes them a little and so on, since there is an infinite amount of nuances of how much someone likes bananas. ![]() There could be an infinite number of gods with only one attribute differing between them, e.g. For example, There is an infinite amount of natural numbers (0/1 to infinity), yet there are numbers which are not natural ones (decimals, negative numbers, non-rational numbers). This is not the logical conclusion of the assumption of an infinite number of gods at all. This is because, in the infinite set of gods, every possible attribute of a god must occur." Of the infinite set of gods that can possibly exist, there necessarily is a god that fits any and every system of rewarding/punishing people in the afterlife. "If one is willing to accept that an infinite number of deities exist, then Pascal's Wager leads to a very interesting conclusion. Just wanted to point out this part is wrong or poorly phrased: Unsigned, by: YR / talk / contribs Anti-Gods I argue in the above that he should really follow the typical utility, which is not really affected by low-probability events.ģ) The 'guillability problem' should be emphasized, too - the same argument could be used to sell snake oil, or any other 'conclusion', clearly indicating that it is not an argument that should convince a rational agent. This could be left as-is, and another "Assumption" added that says the argument assumes a finite probability for the Christian God's existence, and an infinitely small one for others.Ģ) Another assumption made is that a rational agent should maximize the average utility. As it stands, the formulation of the argument is insufficient as it doesn't mention these. I'd like to point to 's_Wager, which I partly wrote and from which I'm putting forward the following:ġ) As mentioned above, the probabilties for believing in various Gods are critical here.
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